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Virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far 
above what is vulgar and ordinary.  
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Part I, Section I, Chapter V. Online) 
 
 
In their article “Inmate Mental Health, Solitary Confinement, And Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment: An Ethical and Justice Policy Inquiry” Heather Bersot and Brice 
Arrigo give us a careful examination of the moral philosophy underpinning the 
adjudication of 8
th Amendment claims made by prisoners with pre-existing mental 
illness subjected to long-term disciplinary solitary confinement. Bersot and Arrigo 
argue that the courts‟ failure to recognize the imposition of such solitary confinement 
as cruel and unusual punishment for the mentally ill is traceable to a primarily 
utilitarian moral philosophy. Though they identify some instances of Kantian or 
deontological moral theory as in evidence in the judgments they examine, they seem 
most concerned with the influence of utilitarian thinking – that if the greater good 
(the protection of other inmates and guards) is served by locking a mentally ill 
person away in a cell by themselves then it is morally justified no matter the harm to 
the prisoner. Rather than focus on deontological morality as the antidote to this kind 
of thinking, Bersot and Arrigo argue that Aristotelian virtue ethics provides the best 
philosophical foundation upon which to build a convincing argument for the 
unconstitutionality of solitary confinement for the mentally ill.  
As I understand it, the argument is that virtue, in the Aristotelian sense, is 
only attainable in association with others. By depriving the mentally ill of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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possibility of association through solitary confinement we deprive them of all 
opportunity of the development of excellence of character, we take them completely 
out of the group for whom it is possible to aim at virtue. For Bersot and Arrigo, this 
Aristotelian insight dovetails into three criminological trends which the authors also 
seek to draw on: commonsense justice which should tell us that it is cruel and 
unusual to discipline a mentally ill person in a way that will exacerbate their mental 
illness, especially when the behaviour for which they are being disciplined is itself a 
product of mental illness; therapeutic jurisprudence which would tell us that it is 
cruel and unusual for the law to act so as to exacerbate mental illness; and 
restorative justice which would tell us that in order to heal wrongdoing, offenders 
must be given the opportunity to restore right-relation and there can be no right-
relation where there is no relation at all.  
In what follows I would like to pursue two related questions: first whether 
virtue ethics really is the best argument against what is, to my mind, the self-
evidently inhumane treatment involved in long-term disciplinary solitary confinement 
of the mentally ill and second, whether drawing on virtue ethics is likely to be more 
persuasive than consequentialist or deontological arguments to judicial decision 
makers.  I shall argue that while Bersot and Arrigo‟s argument from virtue ethics 
provides a novel way of looking at the question of solitary confinement and while 
their discussion certainly shows how the argument from virtue ethics is consistent 
with and supported by the criminological trends mentioned, it provides neither the 
best nor the most persuasive grounding for arguments that such treatment 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.   
Let us begin by recalling that Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics is about 
excellence.  It is a description of nobility and a handbook for greatness. Of all 
Aristotle‟s works, this text paints the most vivid picture of Hellenistic culture of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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third century B.C; its resolutely public nature, its competitiveness, its commitment to 
style, good taste, refinement and beauty, its preoccupation with honour, its 
insistence on a this-worldly understanding of life, its focus on action rather than 
capacity, on achievement rather than potential.  Aristotle‟s virtues by their very 
nature tell us that we are in the realm of supererogation. The book is concerned with 
basic virtues like courage (by which he primarily means military courage) and 
temperance.  But it is likewise concerned with virtues that presuppose wealth, for 
example liberality, which is to be found between prodigality and niggardliness; and 
magnificence, which relates to the spending of large sums for the public good and is 
to be found between ostentation and stinginess.  Other important virtues for Aristotle 
include ready-wittedness, good temper, pride and right ambition.  
The obvious first question then is what help can an incarcerated, mentally ill 
and presumably violent offender subjected to disciplinary solitary confinement hope 
for from a moral theory that is concerned with the highest levels of refinement of the 
human character? Why would one argue from an analysis of the supererogatory to 
conclusions about minimally acceptable treatment for violent offenders suffering 
from psychiatric disorders? One reason might be that the argument from virtue 
ethics harnesses the authority of Aristotle in the service of a progressive 
interpretation of the 8
th Amendment. However Bersot and Arrigo‟s argument – that 
prisoners should be entitled to the society of others as basic precondition for the 
attainment of virtue - rests on a number of implied premises for which Aristotle is 
not authority and for which Bersot and Arrigo have not otherwise argued.  
One implied premise of their argument is that everyone has a right to be 
afforded the preconditions of virtue. A second is that such a right cannot be lost as a 
result of bad behaviour. A third is that the whole task of the cultivation of virtue 
remains relevant and applicable even to those persons who are suffering from severe Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
Special Edition: November, 2010: 110-123    Commentary 
 
113 
 
mental illness.  Bersot and Arrigo‟s argument rests, in other words, on premises that 
the state has a duty to afford to all individuals the opportunity to cultivate good 
character in the future no matter how much their past behaviour demonstrates either 
bad character or an incapacity for good character because of mental illness; that the 
community necessary for citizenship must be extended to all people at all times 
whether they pose a danger to the life or wellbeing of others; and that the society 
necessary for citizenship is a right not a privilege and cannot be withdrawn even if a 
person‟s violent character threatens the lives of others. 
Again, Aristotle is not an authority for any of these premises. Indeed, we 
would have good reason to believe that he would disagree on every point. There is 
nothing in the Nicomachean ethics that would suggest that the vicious person, one 
who has done base rather than noble deeds, could not be deprived of the privileges 
of citizenship and society. Indeed, far from thinking that the opportunity for virtue 
should remain open to all despite past conduct, Aristotle thought that virtue could 
become a logical impossibility for a person as a result of past vice. Speaking of the 
licentious and unjust he writes, “now that they have become what they are, it is no 
longer open to them not to be such.” (Aristotle, J.A.K. Thomson trans., 25) Though 
Aristotle saw punishment as a kind of cure - something for the benefit of the 
offender - there is nothing in his writings that would suggest that he saw banishment 
– the third century B.C. equivalent of solitary confinement - to be per se wrong. We 
see in Aristotle no trace of the idea that person of bad character has a right to a 
never-ending opportunity to develop good character in association with others.  
Furthermore, Aristotle‟s conception of virtue presumes voluntariness. He 
explicitly excludes the mentally ill from the realm of both virtue and vice.  Not even 
the most ardent desire to be virtuous is a sufficient condition for the cultivation of 
virtue. Inability to conform ones actions to the demands of virtue may make virtue Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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impossible. Aristotle opens Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics this way, “Since 
virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions 
praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and 
sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably 
necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for 
legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments.” 
(Aristotle, W.D. Ross trans. Online.) Virtue and vice, honour and punishment 
presume voluntariness. Madness is a condition in which “the moving principle is 
outside.” (Aristotle, W. D. Ross trans. Online.) Thus though pity and pardon should 
be extended to the mentally ill on Aristotle‟s reasoning, they cannot be expected to 
be capable of virtue. Though it might be cruel to deprive them of society its not cruel 
because you are depriving them of the possibility of attaining virtue. Virtue is 
already, sadly, unattainable for the insane.  
The vulnerability of virtue ethics to these objections in the context the 
authors want to use it means that virtue ethics do not ground a first-best argument 
against punitive long-term solitary confinement for the mentally ill. For Aristotle 
neither the bad nor the mad come within the logic of either citizenship or virtue.  
If Bersot and Arrigo, however, were wedded to the notion of citizenship they 
might have supplemented their argument with reference not so much to Aristotle but 
the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Trop v. Dulles (1958) which held 
that deprivation of citizenship “… is a form of punishment more primitive than 
torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in 
the development.” Had they drawn on this decision they might have made a better 
case for relevance of deprivation of citizenship to the 8
th Amendment in the context 
of solitary confinement – the court here showing a clear willingness to entertain the 
idea of citizenship as something so fundamental that it cannot be lost even as a Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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result of bad behaviour. Although the case deals with the notion of statelessness in a 
modern context it would have been an interesting source for Bersot and Arrigo to 
refer to in arguing for their implied premises.  
Let us turn now to the question of whether virtue ethics might promise a 
better persuasive foundation for convincing judicial decision makers to see such 
treatment as an 8
th Amendment violation. Here again, I think virtue ethics is a 
harder sell than arguments that would more squarely join issue with utilitarian 
concerns or than deontological arguments that would identify such treatment as 
torture.  
Allow me to interject here a word about methodology. Much of Bersot and 
Arrigo‟s text is taken up with an explanation of their methodology, their choice of 
cases to examine as well as their method of extracting the moral philosophical 
assumptions informing the judges‟ reasoning; their manner of bringing the 
disciplinary rigours of the social sciences to bear on the analysis of judicial decisions. 
However, one has the sense that the detailed discussion of method is an attempt to 
give the appearance of greater precision than is actually attainable in this kind of 
inquiry.  
Interestingly, Aristotle opens the Nicomachean Ethics with a discussion of 
precision and method. In Book I he writes, “Our discussion will be adequate if it has 
as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought 
for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.… it is the 
mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as 
the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable 
reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.” 
(Aristotle W.D. Ross, trans. Online) Bersot and Arrigo may perhaps be accused of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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being rhetoricians who offer scientific proofs. And the difficulty here is not just that 
they pretend to a precision that cannot be attained in this type of inquiry but it is 
also that by processing the cases in their seemingly scientific method instead of 
reading them more holistically, they miss out, I think, on insights contained in the 
cases about how judges might successfully be persuaded that solitary confinement 
for mentally ill offenders is an 8
th Amendment violation.  
Here I would like to take a closer look at Scarver v. Litscher (2006): a case in 
which I think holds some interesting clues to how courts might be successfully 
persuaded that such solitary confinement is an 8
th Amendment violation.  Scarver v. 
Litscher is one of the cases the authors analyze and peg as an instance of utilitarian 
moral reasoning. The decision is written by Judge Richard Posner, a former law 
professor at University of Chicago and a man widely considered to be the father of 
the law and economics movement.  Bersot and Arrigo locate Judge Posner‟s 
utilitarian bent in his statement, “Prison authorities must be given considerable 
latitude in the design of measures for controlling homicidal maniacs without 
exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary for security.” (Scarver, 2006, p. 
975)  
Interestingly, Posner‟s book The Economics of Justice first published in 1980 
contains an extensive analysis of the moral pitfalls of different modes of moral 
reasoning. Posner wrote, “If monstrousness is a peril of utilitarianism, moral 
squeamishness, or fanaticism is a peril of Kantian Theorists.” (Posner, 1980, p. 58) 
Posner‟s economic theory was an explicit attempt to combine the moral insights of 
both utilitarianism and Kantian theory while eliminating their flaws. While no one, 
including Posner himself,
1 would claim that he was successful in doing so, Posner is 
                                                        
1 See in for example in the preface to the book written after two years on the bench 
Posner writes, “…I hope the ethical theory propounded in Part I of this book will be Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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one judge who can‟t be accused of lack of awareness of the limits of either utilitarian 
or Kantian moral theory. And it would, I think, be a mistake to read his judgment in 
Scarver as being without insight into the difficulties of an either purely utilitarian or 
deontological approach to the issues in the case. Further, it would be a mistake not 
to see the ways in which his judgment gestures toward ways of framing both 
utilitarian and deontological arguments that would be more persuasive in the quest 
to persuade the courts that solitary confinement of the mentally ill is an 8
th 
Amendment violation.   
Scarver was a violent schizophrenic incarcerated for murder who had also 
murdered two prison inmates. One of his prison victims was serial killer Jeffrey 
Dahmer. Both of the prison murders were apparently committed in a delusional state 
and Scarver believed he was acting under orders from God. Of course, millions of 
people around the world thought Dahmer had it coming and, far from blaming 
Scarver, applauded the killing and perhaps even endorsed Scarver‟s delusion of a 
divine commandment to kill.  Posner gives us a clue that if Dahmer had been 
Scarver‟s only victim, the weight the court gave to the prison authorities‟ estimation 
of Scarver‟s dangerousness, and hence the court‟s utilitarian analysis of the case, 
might be different.  “Dahmer, who doubtless would have been executed in any state 
that retains the death penalty, was a unique target. The other inmate whom Scarver 
murdered was not.” (Scarver, 2006, p. 976) 
Further, and more importantly for our purposes, Posner highlights the fact 
that Scarver was “well behaved” in two Colorado prisons where he was held before 
and after the time complained of in the Wisconsin “Supermax.” (Scarver, 2006, p. 
974) Posner notes that in the first Colorado prison Scarver, “was given audio-tapes 
                                                                                                                                                                     
taken in the spirit in which it was intended; as a subject of speculation rather than a 
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to help quiet the voices in his head, worked, and was permitted daily contact with 
other inmates in the prison's recreation yard, all without incident.” (Scarver, 2006, p. 
974) Acknowledging these periods of good behaviour, Posner gestures toward a 
willingness to be persuaded by evidence that means other than solitary confinement 
might be effective in controlling the violence of someone like Scarver. Indeed Posner 
comes close to lamenting the fact that counsel for Scarver did not provide the court 
with evidence that other measures could have achieved the same security objectives. 
Posner writes, “Scarver has presented no evidence concerning the techniques that 
the two prisons in Colorado use to allow a dangerous prisoner to mingle with other 
inmates without endangering them or staff.” (Scarver, 2006, p. 976) Posner 
suggests here a willingness potentially to reject, not utilitarian calculation itself, but 
the particular utilitarian calculus that sees solitary confinement as serving the 
greatest good of the greatest number. He appears to be willing to do so if the 
plaintiff prisoner were to put before him evidence to show that other techniques 
could be as or more effective in preventing violence.  
There is an important insight to be gained here. Ultimately opponents of 
solitary confinement must have something persuasive to say in response to the 
utilitarian argument that no matter how cruel, damaging or destructive it is for the 
mentally ill offender to be placed in long term solitary confinement such, treatment 
may be necessary to protect the lives of fellow inmates and prison staff. To reply 
that the treatment deprives the inmate the opportunity for the development of virtue 
and good character hardly joins issue with the concern at its strongest. You can‟t 
honour one prisoner‟s right to society if doing so will deprive other prisoners of their 
right to life.  
Where might one obtain the kind of evidence Posner seemed willing to 
consider: the kind of psychiatric evidence that would show that solitary confinement Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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because it exacerbates mental illness, renders a mentally ill person more rather than 
less dangerous? One place to look might be to research done in the context of 
mental health facilities where identical safety concerns arise but where the health, 
wellbeing and cure of patients is more squarely on the table as a paramount 
consideration and where punitive aspirations are presumable not present.   
Consider the work of psychiatrist Dr. Steven S. Sharfstein trying to reduce the 
use of restraint and isolation in mental hospitals. Sharfstein argues that helping 
violent patients to understand the triggers of violent episodes and training hospital 
staff in a new culture of violence prevention reduces the need for confinement of 
patients. “At our hospital we have
 moved away from an emphasis on the proper use 
of restraint and
 seclusion to an emphasis on reducing their use by changing the
 
culture of the inpatient stay and by developing tools and techniques
 to prevent 
aggressive episodes from ever escalating to the point
 of needing an intervention that 
requires restraint or seclusion…
 Interventions that reduce violence not only improve 
safety but
 also improve the treatment experience for patients and families.”  
(Scharfstein, 2008, p. 197)  
Those arguing against solitary confinement in prisons should note however 
that even in the hospital, where the well-being of the patient is paramount, concerns 
about preventing harm are still given top priority. Dr. Sharfstein writes: “Without
 
safety, there is no treatment.” (Scharfstein, 2008, p. 198) Nevertheless the hospital 
model offers a starting point from which to challenge the calculations about risk 
assumed in the prison context – that solitary confinement is the most effective 
means of minimizing the risk of violence. Such arguments are unlikely to persuade 
judges to view solitary confinement for the mentally ill as per se a violation of 8
th 
Amendment rights. However, because they do directly address legitimate utilitarian 
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Special Edition: November, 2010: 110-123    Commentary 
 
120 
 
this area and opening up the possibility that such treatment might, at least under 
some circumstances, come to be seen as unnecessary and, therefore, gratuitously 
cruel.  
No judge in Posner‟s position could responsibly dismiss utilitarian concerns by 
shifting to reasoning based on virtue ethics. He simply could not have said, „never 
mind about the risk Scarver poses to fellow inmates and staff, to live a properly 
human life he must be afforded the opportunity to cultivate the virtues and for that 
he needs the society of others.‟ The utilitarian concerns must be met. But what 
should not be overlooked in Posner‟s judgment is the way he gestures toward 
possible ways of shifting the outcome of any utilitarian calculus on the basis of 
evidence that shows that the good of security for fellow inmates and staff can be had 
without the harm of solitary confinement for the prisoner.  
Let us turn now to the potential of deontological arguments to move judges 
closer to viewing such treatment as unconstitutional. Here one could argue that for a 
mentally ill individual long-term solitary confinement may be tantamount to torture. 
To demonstrate this let‟s look again at Scarver v. Litscher. What is interesting about 
the case is the way that Posner identifies so many of the conditions collateral to the 
solitary confinement itself as inhumane. Scarver was on anti-psychotic medication 
and was kept in a cell where the temperature in summer was over one hundred 
degrees. Posner describes the brutality of the conditions in detail: “The heat of the 
cells during the summer interacted with Scarver's antipsychotic drugs to cause him 
extreme discomfort; antipsychotic medication puts a person at risk of heat stroke, 
dangerously low blood pressure, and a rare and often fatal heat-related disease 
called neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS). The constant illumination of the cells 
disturbs psychotics. And without audiotapes or a radio or any other source of sound 
Scarver could not still the voices in his head.” (Scarver, 2006, p. 974) Posner Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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suggests that the constant illumination (so brutal a treatment that I personally can 
hardly bear to think about it) was gratuitous since the guards only looked in on the 
prisoner occasionally. In the tone of Posner‟s judgment we see an acknowledgment 
that these conditions – the heat, its interaction with the anti-psychotic drugs, the 
constant light, the absence of any sound to quite the voices he heard due to his 
schizophrenia inflict gratuitous torment on the mentally ill prisoner. They are 
tantamount to torture.  
But here again Posner points to an evidentiary roadblock in the way of his 
finding them to amount to an 8
th Amendment violation. Posner points out that 8
th 
Amendment jurisprudence requires that the plaintiff prove a mental element 
amounting to “deliberate indifference” to the suffering of the prisoner on the part of 
the prison authorities.  Again Posner comes close to lamenting the lack of evidence 
provided by the plaintiff. He writes: “Scarver's lawyer has not contested the 
defendants' denial that they knew that the conditions of confinement at the 
Supermax prison would aggravate Scarver's mental disease and has not argued that 
the literature was so widely disseminated in correctional circles that it is a fair 
inference that despite their denials they did know that.” (Scarver,  2006, p. 976) 
What Posner gestures to here is the need for better education of prison officials of 
the detrimental psychological effects of solitary confinement on mentally ill prisoners. 
Had the plaintiff Scarver been able to prove that the defendants knew that the 
treatment he was given “inflicted severe physical and especially mental suffering” 
(Scarver, 2006, p. 975) the 8
th Amendment violation might well have been made 
out.  
This does not point to a need for virtue ethics. Rather it points to a need for 
education of prison authorities on the detrimental effects of solitary confinement on 
the mentally ill. It points to a need to disseminate information in the prison system Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Acorn 
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about the ways in which solitary confinement for mentally ill prisoners amounts to 
torture and is therefore something that all prison personnel have a deontological 
moral duty (hopefully translatable into a constitutional duty) to refrain from inflicting 
except in circumstances of extreme necessity.  
Finally, in Posner‟s decision we also see an important recognition of the moral 
inappropriateness of inflicting any punishment whatsoever on a mentally ill person. 
Posner points to the obtuseness of the system which subjects a mentally ill prisoner 
to conditions which exacerbate his mental illness and make it impossible to behave 
more normally and then punish him for erratic behaviour by keeping him in the 
conditions that caused him to behave that way. Posner writes, “Their reactions were 
at times bizarre, as when they denied him a promotion to a higher level because „the 
incident of you banging your head on the wall and other bizarre behavior is not 
appropriate. We highly recommend that you cooperate w/ clinical services so that 
advancement can be considered in the future.‟ He was banging his head because he 
is crazy, not because he was unwilling to cooperate.” (Scarver, 2006, p. 975)  
In Posner‟s judgment then we see a flicker of insight that the whole logic of 
“disciplinary” solitary confinement is inapt for mentally ill prisoners. If as a result of 
mental illness a prisoner pose a serious risk to the lives of others that will likely 
always be seen as justifying some measure of solitary confinement. But it is a very 
different thing to suggest that the mentally ill should be punished for psychotic 
behaviour by subjecting them to conditions that exacerbate their psychosis. This is 
ludicrous and it completely ignores a fundamental premise for which Aristotle is 
perfectly good authority: that voluntariness is a precondition for both praise and 
blame, both honor and punishment.  
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